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Standpoint theory is a social epistemology and aligned methodological stance predicated on the 
understanding that, as recent work in Science and Technology Studies (STS) has shown, scientific 
knowledge of all kinds is irreducibly social (e.g., see Science, Sociology of). It is characterized by a 
distinctive ‘inversion’ thesis according to which those who are marginalized or oppressed, and therefore 
often discounted as knowers, may in fact be better positioned to understand social relations and a range 
of other phenomena than those who are comparatively privileged. This thesis underpins research 
programs within the social and behavioral sciences and offers a rationale for participatory action and 
community-based collaborative research (PAR, CBPR) captured by critical race theorists, feminists and 
others who advocate ‘starting research from the margins’. It has also been extended to the biological and 
physical sciences by practitioners and STS scholars who are intent on understanding how the social 
relations that structure scientific inquiry shape research agendas and outcomes across the sciences.  
 
1. Standpoint Theory’s Central Argument 
 
The central arguments for attributing epistemic advantage to those who are oppressed or marginalized 
stem from Hegel’s ‘master-slave’ dialectic, Marx’s discussions of ideology, and particularly from Georg 
Lukaçs’ discussion of the privileged standpoint of the proletariat. In his 1922 essay ‘Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat’ (in Lukacs 1971), Lukacs argues that the proletariat has the potential to 
develop a privileged standpoint from which to understand the rationalized structure of commodities and 
capital. Under capitalism the bourgeois tend to accept their position as natural and just because it was 
created by them; their class privilege makes it possible to retain a rationalizing illusion of subjectivity with 
respect to their own agency. By contrast, Lukacs argues, the social location of the proletariat is such that 
they routinely run up against arbitrary structures that oppress them and remove much of their subjectivity. 
In this they directly confront the constraining nature of the social relations that sustain capitalism, and the 
disconnect between these conditions of oppression and its rationalization. They thus have the resources 
to recognize that the system and its rationalization is an historical product, its contingency masked by the 
ideology by which it is legitimated. Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci also offer key insights for 
understanding how the lived experience of oppression can give rise to the formation of a critical 
standpoint on oppressive social arrangements (Hennessy 1993). In essence, then, these originating 
forms of standpoint theory offer an account of the blinding power of ideology, and of how it can be 
overcome (see Ideology, Sociology of).  
 
Later standpoint theorists make that case that these insights can be extended to a range of 
intersectionally defined social locations. Social differentiation along lines of gender and race, for example, 
also has the potential to put those disadvantaged by systemic inequality in a position to understand its 
mode of operation and effects with particular clarity. As developed by feminist social scientists and 
theorists through the 1980s – for example, by Nancy Hartsock (1983), Patricia Hill Collins (1986), Dorothy 
Smith (1987), and Sandra Harding (1991) – the cornerstone of feminist standpoint theory is a recognition 
that the rationalization of gender norms as natural reifies social relations, and the observation that direct 
experience of gender discrimination had been the catalyst for articulating a distinctive perspective on 
gender relations. Crucially, feminist theorists argue that situated knowledge of this kind does not, in itself, 
constitute a standpoint (Hennessy 1993). It is through working against discrimination that it becomes 
possible to understand the contingency and the unfairness of ideologically rationalized conditions of life 
that go unrecognized or are unproblematic for those in positions of relative privilege.  To the extent that 
these insights generate a critical standpoint on knowledge production – on the ways in which the 
institutions and products of science are inflected by systemic inequity and the ideologies that rationalize 
them – the situated knowledge of the dispossessed becomes relevant to doing and to understanding 
science. 
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2. Criticisms and Elaborations 
 
The central and most controversial claim associated with standpoint theory is that particular social 
positions have the potential to produce a privileged perspective, not merely another perspective. This has 
attracted two lines of critique: that, to sustain an attribution of epistemic privilege, standpoint theorists 
must be committed to an essentialist conception of the social location and identity of oppressed groups; 
and that they embrace an untenably strong formulation of the ‘inversion’ thesis according to which 
subordinate social location, in itself, warrants an automatic attribution of superior insight. Although the 
central tenets of standpoint theory have been developed in diverse ways by its advocates (see the Signs 
symposium on Hekman 1997), it is difficult to identify anyone who endorses either a strong essentialism 
or an automatic privilege thesis. These views are more typically attributed to standpoint theorists than 
embraced or presupposed by them, often in the context of the Science Wars and identity politics debates 
of the 1990s.  
 
Where the charge of essentialism is concerned, standpoint theorists generally take as their point of 
departure well established critiques of naturalizing (e.g., bio-determinist) conceptions of gender and race 
difference that demonstrate the historical contingency of these social categories and of the systemic 
inequalities they underpin; rather than simply inverting the terms of these constructs, standpoint theorists 
understand them to function as ideological constructs in terms of which normative gender and race 
relations are reified and rationalized. In this spirit the assumption that women must all have something in 
common – some distinctive shared attribute, experience, or situation – has been steadily discredited by 
feminist researchers; intersectional analyses reveal a great deal of diversity among those who are 
structurally subordinate, where once was seen uniformity. By extension, the proliferation of feminist 
perspectives militates against any assumption that there is one correct feminist perspective from which 
vantage point the true nature of gender relations will be revealed. The methodological formulations of 
standpoint theory associated with Smith and developed by Harding – the recommendations to ask how 
the ‘everyday world’ looks to those who primarily operate ‘off-stage’ (Smith 1974) and to ‘think from 
women’s lives’ (Harding 1991) – signals an early commitment to intersectional analysis and suggests how 
diversity can be built into standpoint theory.  
 
The converse worry is that, if here is no gender-specific experience shared by all women, then there is 
nothing to ground a distinctive women’s perspective or feminist standpoint. Similar concerns were raised 
in the context of the identity politics debates of the 1990s with respect to race and class identity, and a 
number of other subject positions that anchor standpoint theories. This objection only holds, however, if it 
can be demonstrated that social differentiation along lines of gender, for example, makes no difference to 
the experience of those so identified. Socialist feminists like Hartsock and Smith, who developed the 
framework for feminist standpoint theory in the 1970s and early 1980s, made the case for recognizing the 
ramifying impact of sex/gender norms on the lives of those socialized as women, shaping the material 
conditions of their lives, their relations of production and reproduction, and thus their epistemic capacities, 
their access to epistemic resources, and their credibility as knowers. More recently, feminist and critical 
race theorists (e.g., Alcoff 2006; Moya and Garcia 2000) have argued that collective identities do not have 
to be ‘quasi-universal’ to give rise to distinctive bodies of experience and perspective that can mobilize a 
critical standpoint on oppressive structures and the legitimating ideology of a dominant culture. This 
resonates with Rosemary Hennessy’s recommendation that a feminist standpoint be understood as a 
form of ‘critical practice’; its ground is not identification with an oppressed social group, but a 
“disidentifying collective subject of critique’, a subject position constituted through systemic analysis of the 
social production of difference (1993). The key point that emerges from this literature is that, although 
they are contingent historical constructs, systems of inequality structure our lives in ways that generate 
not just individual but systematic differences in what we are positioned to experience and to know, and in 
what resources we have for developing a critical standpoint on systemic inequality and its effects (Wylie 
2012). Formulated in non-essentialist terms, this structural ‘situated knowledge’ thesis (Haraway 1991) is 
the central tenet of contemporary standpoint theory and the basis for its claims about epistemic 
advantage on the margins.  
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The second line of criticism – that standpoint theorists accord automatic and comprehensive epistemic 
privilege to those who are socially marginal or subjugated – targets the ‘inversion’ thesis and reflects an 
anxiety about threats of relativism that is never far from the surface in debate about standpoint theory. 
The worry is that, in endorsing a ‘situated knowledge’ thesis, standpoint theorists undermine ideals of 
objectivity; if they hold that all knowledge is robustly contextual, they cannot but substitute an appeal to 
political values and interests for considerations of evidence and good reasons in the evaluation of 
knowledge claims. This line of argument presupposes a conventional understanding of objectivity by 
which it is equated with value-neutral, interest-free impartiality, and assumes that, if we give up the 
conviction that there are universal, trans-historical and context-transcendent norms of justification, then 
we have no basis for comparative evaluation of divergent knowledge claims; each is warranted locally, in 
its own terms and a debilitating epistemic relativism is inescapable. It is true that standpoint theorists join 
a broad constituency of science studies scholars and social epistemologists who have made a convincing 
case for various forms of contextualism (Knorr-Cetina 1981); they share an appreciation that appeals to 
context-transcendent norms of justification are not only untenable, but obscure the contingency and 
interest-specificity of the norms we have come to accept as a measure of objectivity.  
 
At the same time, however, standpoint theorists argue that the polarized opposition between an idealized 
‘view from nowhere’ and self-undermining relativism by no means exhausts the possibilities for 
adjudicating epistemic credibility (Rolin 2006). As critics and theorists of oppression, standpoint theorists 
clearly recognize that effective action aimed at changing oppressive social relations requires accurate, 
probative knowledge of these conditions and they are acutely aware of costs of being wrong. They are 
suspicious of illusions of certainty wherever they arise, but especially when these mask the interests 
embodied in dominant modes of understanding. Rather than rejecting objectivity as a regulative ideal, 
standpoint theorists are more typically intent on reformulating it in terms that take into account the 
situated nature of scientific inquiry and its extant norms of justification. The self-identified radical social 
constructionist Donna Haraway joins standpoint theorists in emphasizing the need to take up the 
challenge of developing a ‘usable doctrine of objectivity’, one that integrates both a recognition that all 
knowledges are situated and a ‘non-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a “real” world’ (1991, 
86-88).  
 
Standpoint theorists are notable for arguing that the resources of situated knowledge have the potential to 
significantly improve the reliability and integrity of the claims we ratify as knowledge; its partiality is not 
necessarily an epistemic liability. Harding, for example, advocates norms of ‘strong objectivity’ (1991, 
1993), a requirement that the assessment of knowledge claims should take into account, not only the 
primary evidence and reasons presented in their support, but also the conditions under which they have 
been produced and ratified: the social, historical circumstances that have shaped the interests of 
practitioners, the institutional contexts in which they work, and the evolving norms of justification in terms 
of which these claims are warranted. The goal here is not wholesale rejection of authoritative sources of 
knowledge like the sciences but to calibrate our confidence in them and to determine how they might be 
improved, especially with respect to scope of applicability and broader impacts. In this spirit standpoint 
theorists direct attention to the transformative impact that feminist, race, class-based and other such 
critiques have had on a range of sciences. They note that, time and again, it has been outsiders to the 
research establishment or ‘insider-outsiders’ (Collins 1986) – practitioners who bring an underrepresented 
and sometimes an explicitly political angle of vision to bear – who have identified gaps and errors in 
research programs that privileged ‘insiders’ have persistently missed, raising the epistemic bar on a 
number of dimensions and opening up productive new lines of inquiry (Wylie 2003). Although she 
identifies as a constructive empiricist, Helen Longino’s proceduralist account of objectivity captures a 
number of the insights that are central to the lessons standpoint theorists draw from consideration of such 
cases (Intemann 2010). She argues that the beliefs we should count as knowledge are those that have 
been subjected to critical scrutiny from ‘multiple points of view’ (2002); mobilizing the resources of 
diversely situated knowers can counteract the effects of insularity and contribute to the breadth and 
robustness of scientific thinking.  
 
There is, however, no guarantee that the experience of oppression or marginality will, in itself, generate 
critical and constructive insights of these kinds. Standpoint theorists acknowledge that systems of 
oppression impose significant epistemic deficits on those they disadvantage; most obviously, the 
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oppressed are often kept in their place in part by being denied access to key epistemic resources like 
literacy, education, and the information necessary to understand the systemic conditions responsible for 
their oppression (Narayan 1988), while insider-outsiders may be loath to risk their tenuous status by 
challenging community norms and can be fierce defenders of the status quo. Strong readings of the 
‘inversion’ thesis are, then, clearly untenable: comprehensive epistemic ‘privilege’ cannot be attributed 
automatically to those who are oppressed just because they are oppressed and standpoint theory cannot 
provide a cut-and-dried formula for identifying particular standpoints that can be counted on to produce 
more objective knowledge. Not surprisingly, then, standpoint theorists typically construe the metaphor of 
privilege in terms of possibilities for understanding. As reformulated in response to critiques of 
essentialism and relativism, standpoint theory is best understood as a conceptual framework, an open-
ended set of analytic resources, for addressing jointly descriptive and normative questions about the 
epistemic effects of oppression (Wylie 2012). Its point of departure is a situated knowledge thesis: one 
that presumes the epistemic relevance of systemic conditions of inequality without specifying in advance 
what their relevance will be in a given context. It directs attention to asymmetries in epistemic 
circumstance which suggest that important epistemic advantages (not privilege) may contingently accrue 
to those who are oppressed; in this it counters patterns of epistemic injustice by which the distinctive 
experience, perspectives, and hermeneutic resources of those who are socially marginal are discounted 
(Fricker 2007). And it provides a rationale for the normative thesis that scientific communities which are 
genuinely inclusive are more likely to recognize their own limitations and to produce a more balanced and 
better warranted understanding of their subject domain.  
 
3. The Domains of Standpoint Thinking in and About the Sciences 
There are a number of contexts in which standpoint theory, conceived in these terms, is relevant to the 
practice of science and to understanding the sciences. We identify two broad domains in which feminist 
and other genres of standpoint theory have been or can be productively applied.  
 
3.1 Content Critiques: From Problem Choice to Framework Assumptions 
Contextual values and interests – ideology of various kinds – most obviously affects the choice of topics 
that are given priority in the sciences. For example feminist critiques of sexism and androcentrism in the 
sciences, developed both by practitioners and science studies scholars, have been instrumental in 
bringing into sharp focus the gendered interests reflected in and served by the research agendas pursued 
by a predominantly male research establishment in a wide range of social, life and physical sciences. 
Standpoint theory figures both as a catalyst for these critiques and as a framework in terms of which to 
understand them. 
 
Critiques of problem choice are best developed, and their standpoint theory implications most explicit, in 
the social sciences where social relations are a direct subject of inquiry. In any number of contexts 
researchers influenced by feminist, critical race, post-colonial theory and related perspectives have drawn 
attention to ways in which the research agenda in their fields takes the attributes, activities and interests 
of privileged men as the norm, focusing inquiry on questions that concern them. In the case of feminist 
research programs that took shape in the 1960s and 1970s, critiques of androcentrism catalyzed what 
were initially ‘remedial’ interventions aimed at adding women and gender to existing research programs. 
The women entering anthropology in unprecedented numbers in the 1960s were quick to recognize the 
need for compensatory ethnography; the lack of attention to women as subjects meant that women’s 
roles and relationships, distinctive sub-cultures and activities, were largely absent from ethnographic 
narratives. Early critics observed that this inattention reproduced characteristic ‘dominant male systems of 
perception’; women’s spheres and cultural understanding were considered only insofar as they figured in 
or were valued by the public languages and worlds of men (Ardener 1975). In a classic example from 
history, Joan Kelly-Gadol objected that the fortunes of women had been left out of account in research on 
the Renaissance (1977). Economists called into question estimates of national productivity that excluded 
consideration of the contributions made by women in the form of unpaid labor within the home or within 
family businesses (Waring 1988). The standpoint theorist Patricia Hill Collins (1986, 1993) drew on her 
working-class Black experience to throw into relief the race and class as well as gendered 
presuppositions that pervasively structured sociological research on ‘the family’. And, famously, the 
feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan challenged Kohlberg’s influential model of moral maturation on 
grounds that it had been based entirely on interviews with boys (1982). This commitment to redirect 
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research priorities is also evident in a substantial shift of focus in primatology where projected gender 
norms had entrenched a presumption that ‘primate society revolves around males’ (Strum and Fedigan 
2000, 5); here a quite literal reorientation of field observation practice generated substantial new data on 
the roles and activities of female primates.  
 
In all these contexts critiques of problem choice quickly exposed gender bias in framework assumptions 
and methodological norms that proved to have much wider implications, calling into question not just 
localized cases of science gone wrong, but pervasive androcentrism in science as usual, indeed, some of 
the best science on offer, as Harding described it (1986). The feminist anthropologists who turned their 
attention to the unstudied domestic spheres in which women operated soon recognized that the 
distinction between public and private was itself problematic; the problem with androcentric ethnographies 
was not just the absence of women but the imposition of ethnocentric categories presumed to be 
universal that did not begin to do justice to the diversity of gendered roles and relations they were 
encountering. The questions Kelly-Gadol raised about historical accounts of the Renaissance were 
intended from the start to challenge the periodization schemes in terms of which history has been written. 
The Renaissance, she argued, was anything but a period of cultural rebirth, viewed from the vantage 
point of women, moreover, the ‘pattern of relative loss for women’ that she noted for this period was a 
direct consequence of its accomplishments and typical for periods of ‘so-called progressive change’ 
(1976). Reflecting on women’s history more generally, Peter Novick observes that ‘feminist perspectives 
in history were as relevant to such male activities as war and diplomacy as they were to realms in which 
women dominated’ (1988, 496). Likewise, historians, sociologists, and economists have all had to 
reassess the assumption that the ‘household’ could be taken for granted as a relatively fixed and 
uncontroversial unit of analysis. When they attended to gender roles and relations they found conflicts, 
differences in interest, and diverse social configurations that call into question not only what they had 
assumed about households, but about labor markets, ‘human capital’ and the causes and effects of 
poverty (Collins 1991). As controversial as Gilligan’s positive account of a ‘different voice’ has been, her 
critique of Kohlberg was pivotal in destabilizing the Piagetian assumption that moral development must 
follow a single, universal trajectory. Finally, the new data from primatology has not only fundamentally 
changed our understanding of contemporary primates – bringing into focus the central role of females, 
and the importance of social dynamics other than aggression, hierarchy, and competition – it has also 
reframed theorizing about human evolution.  
 
This roster of examples could be expanded in any number of directions. As Novick argues for history, 
critical analysis arising from underrepresented, subdominant subject positions – as defined by race, 
gender, and class, colonial status and indigeneity, by ablist and heterosexist norms, to name a few – have 
to varying degrees transformed virtually every field of human, social sciences since the 1970s, throwing 
into sharp relief the interest and context-specificity of entrenched, seemingly neutral field-defining 
agendas and framework assumptions. In this, standpoint theorists join science studies scholars in 
detailing myriad ways in which the values that set the research agenda also permeate the research 
process. Given their central interest in conditions of oppression, standpoint theorists are centrally 
concerned to understand, as well, the role played by authoritative research in the construction and 
legitimation of the social world from which these values arise. They attend to what Ian Hacking refers to 
as ‘looping’ effects, by which scientists not only reproduce but participate in constituting and amplifying 
the social relations that they see in society (1999); they ask not only whose interests are reflected in 
entrenched research programs, but who benefits and who is harmed.  
 
Such critiques are by no means limited to the social sciences. Consider, for example, the objections 
raised by the women’s health movement of the 1960s and 1970s to the conventional focus of medical 
research on the ailments of men, and the presumption that male bodies and disease profiles could stand 
as the norm for the medical diagnosis and treatment of women. As Londa Schiebinger describes it, 
feminist activism was responsible for ‘a great awakening…of mainstream medicine to women's health 
concerns’; it directed attention not only neglected conditions that are specific to women, like osteoporosis 
and breast cancer rather than heart disease and erectile dysfunction, but also put pressure on medical 
researchers to take account of ways in which women's health and disease profiles diverge from models 
based on studies of male subjects (1999, 113). Heart disease is one prominent example of a well studied 
condition the understanding of which was based, until the late 1980s, almost entirely on samples of men 
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even though it concerned the effects of hormones like estrogen. More generally, the practice of relying on 
all-male samples to test drug safety and efficacy has been a highly visible target of critique, resulting in 
formal regulations that now require the inclusion of female subjects. The AIDS/HIV activism that resulted 
in the redesign of anti-retroviral drug trials is another well documented example in which outsiders to the 
research establishment played an instrumental role in exposing systematic bias in the direction of 
research effort (Epstein 1996). In the domain of technology (see Gender and Technology), both intended 
and indirect effects have been the focus of critique. In fact, every field of inquiry has at least some 
instrumental uses, and many forms of applied knowledge have some relevance to the gendered, as well 
as race and class structure of society. Topics within so-called ‘pure’ physics are connected to military 
uses, and are funded precisely because of those uses (see Science, Technology, and the Military). Those 
who have the least opportunity to participate in benefits of high status of military engagement suffer 
disproportionately from the consequences of war.  
 
Contemporary standpoint theory was in large part catalyzed by these interventions. Harding was explicit 
that the motivation for her early exploration of standpoint theory was the question, ‘why has the 
sex/gender system become visible only now?’ (the title of Harding 1983). She found it striking that the 
incisive critiques of ingrained sexist and androcentric bias in status quo research programs had persisted 
for decades. On this and many other fronts the sciences had not proven to be self-correcting; the impetus 
to attend to longstanding gaps and distortions in scientific understanding of everything from social 
relations and sex difference to economic systems and biomedical conditions was due to external 
stakeholders whose interests were not reflected in or served by conventional research programs, and to 
the growing numbers of women and members of other underrepresented groups who entered the 
academy in the 1960s and 1970s. These critics drew explicitly on their distinctive situated experience in 
raising corrective evidence and insights that had not figured in their disciplinary tradition, but often their 
critiques were self-limiting; they did not intend to question entrenched norms of justification that privilege 
decontextualizing ideals of objectivity and many were vocal insisting that their contributions had nothing to 
do with their minority status. Those who did bring to bear feminist, critical race, queer, post-colonial, and 
other self-consciously situated, often explicitly political standpoints, did disrupt established patterns of 
thinking more fundamentally. But rather than compromising the integrity of the research process, the 
questions generated by their diverse perspectives often significantly raised the bar epistemically; they 
subjected entrenched assumptions to newly rigorous critical scrutiny and called for consideration of a 
wider range of interpretive or explanatory possibilities, new lines of evidence, and undervalued 
methodological strategies, in the process making substantial contributions to their disciplines’ 
understanding of traditional as well as new subject matters.  
 
This poses a challenge to conventional norms of justification and conceptions of objectivity on at least two 
fronts: it throws into relief the partiality and interest-specificity of bodies of knowledge that had been 
presumed objective (in the value-neutral, interest-free sense); and it demonstrates the epistemic 
contributions that can arise from mobilizing explicitly situated perspectives. Standpoint theorists take up 
this challenge, articulating the conceptual framework for a research program in social epistemology and 
STS (science and technology studies) that responds to this crisis of confidence in conventional norms of 
justification. It is characterized by the articulation of a situated knowledge thesis that highlights the 
systemic conditions that configure our epistemic capabilities, by an emphasis on recognizing epistemic 
advantage on the margins, and by the proposal of alternative conceptions of objectivity. This last includes 
proceduralist accounts that focus attention on the jointly social and cognitive conditions which ensure the 
possibility of transformative criticism, and norms of strong objectivity that build an ongoing critical 
appraisal of the conditions of knowledge production into the adjudication of knowledge claims.  
 
 
3.2 Equity Critiques and Collaborative Practice  
 
To varying degrees, diverse forms of discrimination are a normal part of the working environment in all of 
the sciences, embodied in everything from the allocation of funds and skewed citation patterns to patterns 
of workplace segregation, the structure of the tenure system, and the myriad effects of insider networks 
and hierarchical prestige systems. Equity activists, disproportionately women and members of other 
underrepresented groups, vocally challenge these entrenched practices as unjust and unsupportable in 
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an enterprise defined by meritocratic ideals. Increasingly, however, the impetus for documenting and 
counteracting discrimination within the sciences is not only a commitment to social justice but, at an 
institutional and state level, by a concern that the sciences cannot afford to squander trained talent by 
tolerating sexist, racist and other prejudices. Standpoint theorists extend this generic argument for equity, 
arguing that discrimination exacts more specific costs than a diminution of the pool of trained talent; it 
robs the sciences of key epistemic resources as well. A growing number of cases bring to light the costs 
of gender-based discrimination: feminist examples include key discoveries by women that were not 
recognized for decades, and patterns of workplace segregation and citation bias that conspire to 
marginalize the contributions from subfields or in niches dominated by women. More generally, the recent 
history of content critiques outlined above draws attention to pervasive risks of group-think in socially 
homogenous, insular research communities. Standpoint theorists join equity activists in making the case 
for recruitment and training practices, and for reconfiguring reward structures, that will greater diversity in 
research communities, but they add a normative, epistemic justification for these interventions. They 
make the case that, although the contributions of researchers drawn from diverse backgrounds cannot be 
specified in advance, will expand the range of experience, heuristics, and perspectives that the scientific 
community can bring to bear in subjecting its norms of justification, and institutional practices as well as 
its best theories to critical scrutiny. There is ample evidence coming from a cross-section of the sciences 
– especially the social and behavioral sciences – that this kind of diversity is necessary to ensure the 
integrity and reliability of the knowledge ratified as scientific.  
 
On this account standpoint theory is not only a critical practice but also a source of normative insight 
about strategies for improving scientific inquiry, making it more robust, relevant, and accountable. In this 
spirit Dorothy Smith has long insisted that standpoint theory is, above all, a methodology predicated on a 
commitment to level the hierarchical relationship between research and subject, recognizing the wisdom 
of insiders to the contexts studied by social scientists. This is the principle that underpins the 
recommendation to ‘start research from the margins’ (Smith 1974; Harding 1991). A similar case for 
recognizing relevant expertise held by non-scientists is also made in a range of biological, medical, and 
physical sciences. Brian Wynne details what sheep farmers know about the ecological impact of nuclear 
fall-out that scientists miss altogether in the context of an STS analysis of expertise (1996), and any 
number of citizen science initiatives, DIY-research communities, and the medical research activists 
discussed earlier bear witness to the expertise that lay practitioners have to offer fields as diverse as 
astronomy, genomics, infectious disease research, and field biology.  
 
These principles of recognizing and engaging various forms of expertise that lie outside professional 
science are perhaps best exemplified by the long-standing traditions of community-based participatory 
research (CBPR) and participatory action research (PAR). The ideal here is that researchers should work 
in partnership with non-scientific communities, collaboratively defining the problems they will address and 
drawing on the expertise of community partners at every stage of the research program. The sociologists 
Elizabeth Petras and Douglas Porpora (1993) make the standpoint theory rationale for such practice 
explicit, arguing that PAR practice is motivated not only by a political, ethical commitment to be 
responsive to and to treat local communities respectfully, but by a recognition that the poor and 
oppressed bring significant epistemic resources to the table. They are ‘epistemically privileged’ in ways 
that can be expected to ‘generate knowledge and insights’ on a number of dimensions – a ‘spectrum of 
theory, methods and substance” (1993, 107) – that represent significant contributions to disciplinary social 
science. The history of such research in its various forms is detailed with particular clarity in the context of 




Science and technology studies bring into sharp focus the local and contextual origins of scientific 
knowledge; however universal the decontextualized results of inquiry may seem to be, they carry with 
them parochial assumptions that arise from a particular social order, and can play a powerful role in 
legitimating these assumptions. Standpoint theorists take up a particular set of questions and challenges 
posed by these insights. They engage in a practice of science critique aimed at countering the erasure of 
the situated interests that shape the sciences, and they are particularly attentive to the role played by 
dominant systems of knowledge in reproducing and amplifying systems of oppression. At the same time, 
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standpoint theorists are intent on improving scientific practice. They draw a number of critical and 
constructive lessons from critiques which demonstrate that insular scientific communities are not reliably 
self-correcting; it often takes the input of ‘insider-outsiders’ who bring to bear dissonant experience and a 
critical angle of vision to identify persistent errors and missed possibilities in inquiry. Standpoint theorists 
make the case for a modest ‘inversion thesis’: that a range of epistemic advantages may accrue to those 
who must navigate the constraints of an oppressive social order from a position of systemic 
disadvantage. And they articulate, on this basis, an epistemic rationale for fostering diverse, 
representative, and democratic scientific communities: that the integrity and applicability of scientific 
knowledge requires the input of diverse critical perspectives, including those of nonscientists. This 
framework for critique and constructive intervention is potentially relevant to all branches of science, 
inasmuch as scientific inquiry is a thoroughly social process and perspectives that bring into view the 
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